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Abstract
Security compliance has now become a major information systems management problem thanks to
government regulations. Organizations are now developing methodologies and tools to assess
compliance of Information Systems (IS) security. The research outlined in this paper is part of a
longitudinal action research study which aims to help inform and improve security within Whole of
Government (WoG). This paper examines the different effects of organisational size on IS security
compliance within government organisations and how the adoption of security controls differed
across small, medium and large government agencies. This paper identifies differences across
government agencies rather than assuming that IS security compliance within e-government would
be the same for different sized agencies. The approach utilised within this study may be extended to
assess compliance with regulations in small, medium and large, multi-unit organizations in other
sectors as well as government.
Keywords: Compliance, Information System, Security, Risk, e-Business, e-Government

Introduction
The transformation from traditional government practices to e-Government 14 may prove to be one
of the most important policy decisions in the history of government. Research and popular press
indicate that one of the major concerns of business and consumers is the security of on-line
communications and financial transactions (eCommStrategies, 2000). Progress of e-Government
will continue to grow if business and government are convinced that transactions are secure and
reliable (The Audit Office of New South Wales, 2002).
An increasingly important aspect of government business is the development of e-Commerce
systems commonly known as e-Government (Carter & Balanger, 2004). e-Government research is
still immature as are e-Government business models and the benefits, which have not been fully
realised. The current published literature focuses mainly on research areas such as business redevelopment of e-Government (driving government reform); connecting business to government
connecting customers to government services; e-procurement or the payment of bills on-line;
simplifying the processes of conducting business by on-line services; and grouping e-government
into a one approach for all (Fingar, 1998). Current literature, however does not address a number
of the main e-Government concerns surrounding risk and security issues.
The purpose of e-Government security systems is to safeguard the information being transmitted
within the framework of electronic service delivery (Pivk, 2000). A New South Wales audit report
14

“The use of information and communications technologies, and particularly the Internet, as a tool to achieve
better government” (OECD, 2003 p1)
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(2002, p.36) however stated, “There appears to be limited knowledge at line agency level of the
risks associated with increased use of the Internet and related technologies, and how best to
manage them”. This paper outlines a research study which was an initiative of New South Wales
Government to assist government agencies to improve the overall understanding of government’s
IS risks and security compliance. As the volume of electronic transactions is increasing, the extent
of threats is also increasing from areas like hacking, virus infections and website defacement. It is
crucial for government agencies to maintain trust with all participants and ensure associated risks
are well managed (WA, 2003; Whitman, 2004). Most governments in Australia now adopt a risk
management approach to security, based on risk identification, risk analysis and mitigation,
combined with techniques to create awareness, deter, prevent, detect and recover from disasters.

Information Systems Security
Information Systems Security (ISSec) is the effective implementation of policies to ensure that the
confidentiality, availability and integrity of information and assets are protected from theft,
tampering, manipulation or corruption. Heekes (2002), Hof (2002) and WA Government (2003)
highlight the importance of IS security within e-Government systems. Electronic information is
extremely portable and very easy to change. The administration, business and legal processes
associated with security and protection of electronic government information have not been fully
developed (Scott, 2003). Consequently, government projects are endeavouring to develop policies
and procedures to improve security (Frank, 2003). From the public’s perspective, government is
seen as one entity; hence a security problem within one agency may be viewed as a failure of the
government as an entity.
IS Security (ISS) has previously concentrated on protecting the confidentiality of documents stored
electronically. In terms of the public perception of government organisations, security means the
protection of records and data that are held for the purpose of administering the acts and policies of
government agencies (Martin, 2005). This applies equally to paper documents as well as the data
held in computer databases (Kiel, 2003). The rapid growth in the volume of information stored
electronically and the uptake of e-Commerce within government has heightened the need for
increased security to protect the privacy of this information and prevent fraudulent activities
(Spinellis, 1999).
The process of improving security within the Whole of Government (WoG) therefore is viewed as
essential. It is clear that where the public is involved in transacting electronically with government,
public confidence is essential to ensure the future viability of these services. Cost savings are a
major driving factor towards an increased use of electronic services, especially as the government
is moving towards greater efficiency within the public service. The Office of Information and
Communication Technology (OICT, 2004) in NSW outlines several benefit categories related to
investment in information technology, as they relate to community expectations for:
o improved service;
o wider range of services;
o tailored services;
o geographic access to services;
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o new legislation or regulations introduced;
o equity of access policies;
o reduced real operating budget;
o competition for resources;
o demand growing faster than resources; and
o changes in technology price/performance.
These driving factors can only be achieved where public confidence, and hence appropriate
security, is established with the relevant information systems within the public service. These
factors are a direct reference to the Critical Success Factors (CSF) of
AS/NZS17799.2001/Amendent:1-2004, and underpin the successful implementation of the
standard and the community expectations it reflects.

Information Systems Security Standard
A number of frameworks AS/NZS4444:1999 have been developed and tested since the 1970s to
quantify and manage the issue of information system security (Mitrou, et al, 2005). Australia’s
standard for Information Security Management, AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (Information technology Code of practice for information security management), provides a framework and set of
recommendations in a risk management context. Based on the British BS7799 Standard,
AS/NZS17799.1:2001 has been revised for application to e-Commerce, and re-branded from its
previous incarnation as AS/NZS4444.1:1999 Part 1 and AS/NZS4444.2:2000 Part 2. The
Australian Standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001 and AS/NZS7799.2:2000 (revised as
AS/NZS17799.2:2003) was selected as the framework for the project as it allowed agencies to be
accredited to a nationally accepted and reliable approach methodology which also linked to the
Australian Standard for risk management AS4360:1999 (revised in 2004). A more detailed
chronology of the dates of introduction for IS Security standards in shown in figure 1 below.
The focus of AS/NZS17799.1:2001 is to protect security of information by providing a set of
controls and best practices for situations that are applicable for e-Commerce. With the increasing
volume of business being conducted between organisations over electronic networks, it is essential
that a trusted relationship be established between the stakeholders trading together. One such
scheme is for all parties to agree on an appropriate standard (AS/NZS17799.1:2001), adopt its
principles, and move to certification. Accreditation and certification is possible for 7799 and
recognised internationally (under ISO 17799) (Mitrou, et al, 2005), however, there are very few
organisations that can offer this service and currently only two (2) organisations are offering the
service of accrediting organisations and agencies in Australia. The adoption of standards is
becoming increasingly important to establish benchmarks by which organisations and clients,
conducting business on-line, can be assured. An additional benefit of this standard is its regular (6
monthly) review to ensure that certification to the standard is maintained, thus providing extra rigor
to security compliance.
Risk management is also an integral part of AS/NZS17799.1:2001 security certification.
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AS/NZS17799.1:2001 recommends a series of actions to define the scope/functions of the business
project, and subsequently attempts to define the security risks associated within the scope of the
project. Risks are then analysed, ordered and controls are proposed and actioned. To define the
scope of the AS/NZS779.1:2001 accreditation project, the standard is broken into ten major control
categories for information security, which are shown in Table 3.4. Within the framework of the ten
major categories in the security standard, AS/NZS17799.1:2001 there are 127 security controls.
These controls enable agencies to identify and develop safeguards to protect their information
resources. Recently the standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001 has been superseded by an International
Standard ISO/IEC27001:2005.

Figure 1: Chronology of IS Security Standards

Little is written on the risks, risk management and the level of security required to provide
effective security for e-Government. Even less is written about recognising the differences
between government agency categories where agencies are very diverse in size, function and
funding. The vast majority of literature groups all agencies into one category type for research
treatment (Cushing, 2005).

Agency Categories
While the majority of literature groups agencies in one category governments themselves group
agencies into many different categories for varying reasons. Firstly governments can categorise
agencies into similar functions or portfolios (eg, health, justice, natural resources etc). Secondly
agencies can be categorised by funding source either from government directly, a government
trading organisation or a state owned corporation. For financial reasons (such as payroll), however,
agencies are commonly grouped by size with full-time employee numbers (FTE) as the defining
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criterion. Grouping by FTE is also used by other Australian governments, namely the Western
Australian (WA, 2004) government, Australian the Federal government (ABS, 2005) the New
Zealand government (New Zealand, 2004) and other international governments.
Another complication is that some small agencies host their IT systems with a central government
agency bureau. This structure allows the creation of clusters groups and streamlines their IT
operations. These clusters can be based either on shared arrangements by business type or portfolio
affinity. This clustering reduces the time or resources expended on improving security for
individual agencies. These clusters would create a bias towards the large agencies in terms of the
management of shared services., because of there individual significance to the government

Study Motivation
Although the state government takes the responsibility for information security, it is left to the
government agency level to manage and develop strategies and polices to protect their own
information. As individual agencies are the custodians of this information, they are in the best
position to assess its value, and develop the appropriate security measures to protect and preserve it
from threats (internal/external) and other risks.
Since individual agencies are responsible for their information this research seeks to determine an
overall “rich picture” of the current status of IS security within these agencies. This philosophy is
aligned to a ‘whole-of-public sector’ framework developed in 1977 (the Information Management
& Technology Blueprint). This approach is necessary due to the increased connectivity between
external agencies, businesses and individuals. Information transfers are becoming seamless and
agencies need to review their security policies and practices to incorporate these connections (such
as telecommunications, banking and many other services) and to review the inherent risks. In order
to manage security effectively across government and other organisations, a benchmark needs to
be established. National and International standards provide the level of consistency required to
become a yardstick or measure as a consistent benchmark to security.
The NSW Government adopted the AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (Information technology - Code of
practice for information security management) standard as the minimum level of IS security for
agencies to achieve. Agencies were required to achieve compliance to this standard within three
years starting in December 2001 to ensure a consistent approach to information security.
The focus of this study was to determine the factors or groups of factors that would assist agencies
and organisations of different sizes improve the overall level of IS security based on
AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (Information security management - Specification for information security
management systems). The security control relating to this area of results and the Australian
Standard are technological, physical, policy and personnel etc (Wood, 2001). These controls are
the essence of an effective security framework. This framework has been validated in the
Government of New South Wales (one of the six largest economies in the in Australia-Pacific
region) in Australia. This research may also be useful in developing a methodology for the
assessment of compliance in all organisational sectors and settings.

Research Methods
This study concentrates on agency size as the method of agency categorisation. Categorising
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Grouping agencies this way aligns them with other findings within the government domain.
This study adopts the small-medium-large grouping of government agencies based on full–time
equivalent (FTE) staff numbers to analyse government responses to the survey. Although several
category classifications may be applied, categorisation by government agency size in terms of FTE
appears to be an accepted and established measure used already across NSW government. These
categories are defined in Table 1 following:

Category

Size

Count 15

Large

> 1000 FTE.

~ 11

Medium

350 – 1000 FTE; and

~ 19

Small

< 350 FTE 16;

~78

Table 1 – Agencies Categories

The Australian Standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (Information technology - Code of practice for
information security management) contains ten major sections (see Table 2) of which nine deal
with security issues and one with Business Continuity Planning.
Since agencies are required to achieve certification to the standard, the online survey questions
developed for this study were grouped around the Security and Business Continuity Planning areas
of the standard.

Survey Instrument
An on-line survey (containing 85+ questions based on the Australian Standard
AS/NZS17799.1:2001) was developed to measured agencies status using Likert-scale; yes/no radio
button and short answer and comments. An analysis of the survey results was undertaken to
determine the status of agencies in terms of security readiness and summarised to provide an
overall measure. The survey was conducted between November 2001 and December 2004. Seven
survey cycles were conducted across approximately 120 NSW government agencies. The number
of survey questions increased during the study in three phases (also shown in table 2).

Action Research Approach
The survey administration and development was part of a three-phase longitudinal research design
that involved an initial exploratory strategy and an iterative development cycle of the survey which
formed the basis of an action research study. An action research approach was used as a method to
15

The count of agency numbers in categories varies due to agency splits and mergers dictated by central government
discussions.
16

Full Time Equivalent staff – (FTE)
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directly intervene in the longitudinal survey cycles (Farbey et al., 1999). Action research is
concerned with diagnosing “a problem in a specific context and attempting to solve it in that
content” (Cohen & Manion, 1989 p2; Altrichter, 1990). Action research can also be described as a
“cyclic or spiral process, which alternates between action and critical reflection“ (Dick, 2002 p4).
The flexible nature of action research is achieved by its cyclic process (see figure 2), allowed the
iterations of the survey to develop a greater understanding of IS Security across the agency survey
participants. These participants were the agencies nominated IS Security Manager.

Survey Cycle 1

Survey Cycle 2

Survey Cycle 3 - 7
Plan

Plan

Evaluate

Plan
Evaluate
Evaluate

Survey

Survey
Analyse

Survey
Analyse

Analyse
Figure 2: Action Research Interacting Spiral

Key AS/NZS17799.1:2001 Control Categories for Information Survey
Security
S1 S2

S3

Security Policies







Security Organisation








Asset Classification & Control


Personnel Security



Physical / Environmental Security



Computer & Network Mgt.



Systems Development & Maintenance





System Access Control





Business Continuity Planning



IS Policy Compliance
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Survey Cycle Questions

Survey
S1

S2

Survey cycles 1 to 7 contains questions from S1



Survey cycles 3 to 7 contains questions from S1 and S2





Survey cycles 4 to 7 contained all questions





S3



Table 2 – Key Security Issues and Survey Distribution of Questions

Agencies were directed by the “Head of State” to better manage the risks to their information
systems and apply the necessary controls and security measures to improve their overall level of
security and achieve the benchmark of certification to the standard within three years.
The survey was administered through an action research approach as many of the agencies had
little or no experience with or awareness of the security standard and the full range of issues that
could impact on them. The three project stages of a longitudinal seven survey cycle action research
methodology saw the gradual administration of the survey questions S1, S2, S3 (see also Table 2)
to an agency’s IS security manager in order to gradually improve their knowledge of IS security
measures at a manageable rate (considering the other demands the organisation places on their
duties and time).

Results
Agencies were asked if they had an IS security framework in place. The 10 categories of
AS/NZS17799.1:2001 provided a universally recognisable description of a information security
framework to the survey respondents. The requirements of the standard are an “already accepted
part of the IT Security landscape and will likely be so for the foreseeable future” (Bindview, 2004
p4).
The three sub-category of agencies (large, medium and small) are discussed below:
Large agencies (over 1000 FTE staff) have sufficiently large corporate services structures to
undertake a security program to achieve accreditation to the standard of AS/NZS17799:2001. They
generally have enough resources to utilise technology wherever possible to achieve compliance to
the standard.
However many large agencies are highly decentralised across long distances and many buildings
which creates difficultly achieving accreditation across so many facilities. This problem is
addressed in the risk analysis stage of accreditation where the highest risk business
functions/processes are mitigated first and lower risk functions are subsequently dealt with.
For those agencies covering a wide geographic area, the regional or decentralised offices are
usually similar in terms of organisational structures and duties performed. The process of
accreditation can be scoped to permit a reduction of the number of regional offices needing
accreditation for the entire organisation.
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Medium-sized agencies (between 350 and 1000 FTE staff) have demonstrated the most
commitment towards accreditation for their security program. In addition, they also participated in
internal shared corporate services (mainly business process re-engineering) to consolidate services
into fewer hardware platforms, which in turn allows more streamlined IT/IS systems.
Small agencies (under 350 FTE staff) present a more varied picture. Improving IS security across
these agencies requires significant improvement due to the lack of resources and staff assigned to
improving security.

Security Policy
Combined
Survey

No

Yes

Date

Nov_01
Jan_02
Apr_02
Aug_02
Nov_02
Nov_03

Small
%

No

Yes

Yes

39

41

46

50

49

57

50

58

55

58

50

67

51
52
54
54
51
57

Medium
%

No

Yes

Yes

29

28

33

32

37

34

39

33

40

34

36

42

49
49
48
48
46
54

Large
%

No

Yes

Yes

5

6

5

6

5

10

5

12

8

9

9

9

55
55
67
71
53
50

%
Yes

5

7

8

12

7

13

6

13

7

15

5

16

A change of government after the 2003 election caused an agency re-shuffle
48
61
34
44
9
10
4
Nov_04
56
56
53

7

58
60
65
68
68
76

58

Table 3 – Agencies with or without a Security Policy

Table 3 highlights the percentage of agencies with a security policy, across small, medium and
large categories.
Table 3 and Figure 3, demonstrate that the number of agencies with a security policy change over
the period from November 2001 to November 2003 for the small (49% - 54%), medium (55% -
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50%), large (58% - 76%) and combined groupings (51% - 57%). The November 2004 reflected the
changes in government resulting from an agency re-shuffle. The recorded decrease in large agency
security policies was possibly due to ‘new’ managers not being fully aware of their responsibilities
in terms of the government’s IS security initiative.
Overall there was an increasing trend in the number of agencies with a security policy and the
decrease in the number of agencies without a security policy. Part of this improvement may be
attributable to the action research approach of this study. However, there was scope for
improvement with 46% of agencies still having no security policy. The remaining agencies without
a security policy were more likely to have a more reactive approach to security. These agencies
generally wait for security issues to emerge and then respond to the threat, in contrast to an agency
having a consistent approach from having an actively documented IS security policy thus being
pro-active before threats emerge.
Agencies were then asked if they had a dedicated IS security manager (see Table 4). The role of
the IS security manager, was defined as having the responsibility for co-ordinating the
implementation of IS security.
Security Policy - Combined
80
no
yes
70

67
61

60
50
50

40

58

57

58
55

50

49

50

48

46
41

39

30

20

10

0

Sep_01

Jan_02

Apr_02

Aug_02

Nov_02

Nov_03

Nov_04

no

39

46

49

50

55

50

48

yes

41

50

57

58

58

67

61

Figure 3 - Agencies with an IS Security Manager (S-M-L Combined)

The percentage increase in the number of IS security managers demonstrates a commitment to
security within the agencies, indicating that management was becoming serious about the IS
security problem. In terms of agency categories for the small agencies the percentage of IS security
managers increased over the four years of the survey from 74% to 84%. For medium sized
agencies the percentage of IS Security managers decreased from 100% to 70% over the survey but
the number of IS Security managers did increase from 6 to 14 managers. The large agencies
percentage of IS Security managers remained relatively constant (approximately 70%) however the
number of IS Security managers increased from 5 managers to 14 over four years.
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A detailed analysis of the on-line survey questionnaire has not been presented in this paper.
However the results showed variable and significant differences between agency S/M/L categories
across the seven cycles of the longitudinal survey study. The full survey results also demonstrated
the impact of the action research approach to survey administration i.e. it raised awareness
gradually (as well as giving incremental feedback to agencies while they learned about security
compliance). Differences in resource allocation (namely IS Security Managers) between agencies
of different sizes and the impact of security compliance to the standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001 were
also highlighted.
In terms of completely complying with the standard only a relative few agencies managed full
certification within the three-year project; however, the greater majority did make significant
progress toward this goal and many other agencies subsequently did at well. The agencies that
achieved full certification were in the category of medium sized agencies (in the range of 300-500
FTE staff), thus indicating IS staff and management within the agencies had the required
knowledge, understanding and expertise to identify the need for effective security and begin the
project immediately.

Do you have an IS Security Manager?
Survey
Date
Nov_01
Nov_01
Nov_01
Combined
Jan_02
Jan_02
Jan_02
Combined
Apr_02
Apr_02
Apr_02
Combined
Aug_02
Aug_02
Aug_02
Combined
Nov_02
Nov_02

Agency Size
Small
Medium
Large

Small
Medium
Large
Small
Medium
Large
Small
Medium
Large
Small
Medium

No

Yes

9
0
2

26
6
5

13
0
6
14
3
6
14
3
4
15
3

No of Survey 17
respondents

37
35
8
9
52
44
9
11
64
42
10
11
63
49
12

80

98

111

114

17

% of IS Sec
Mgrs
74
100
71
46.3%
73
100
60
53.1%
76
75
65
57.7%
75
77
73
55.3%
77
80

Total number of surveys received those who did not answer this questions were assumed to have no IS Security
Manager.
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Nov_02
Combined
Nov_03
Nov_03
Nov_03
Combined
Nov_04
Nov_04
Nov_04
Combined

Large
Small
Medium
Large
Small
Medium
Large

5
10
3
6
12
4
6

15
76
62
14
13
89
61
14
14
89

75
114

66.7%
86
82
68

118

75.4%
84
78
70

112

79.5%

Table 4 – Agencies with an IS Security Manager

The small agencies generally had difficulty with their security projects although the percentage of
agencies with IS Security Managers was high as they were mainly part-time positions however
50% of them had IS security policies. Conversely, the large agencies generally had too many core
information systems to attempt to make them security compliant with all their systems. They had
the lowest number of IS Security Managers at approximately 60% but further analysis suggested
that they used specialist consultants to develop security policies. This explains why 58% - 76% of
agencies have security policies, which for some very large agencies was an enormous task.
Agencies in both these categories (small and large) would have benefited by adopting, a risk
management approach that would allow them to identify those systems that were crucial to the
agency and concentrate on making them compliant to the standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001. This
would provide the greatest security protection to that agency’s most critical system(s).
Both small and large agencies had this problem because they generally lacked a risk management
strategy. A well developed business impact analysis would have allowed the available resources to
be better used and permit the agency to learn the process of becoming certified to the major
business system (and then subsequently roll out other less crucial systems).
Large agencies have the benefit of more resources being available for projects, however large
agencies also have substantial IS/IT system investments. Any changes, updates or upgrades are
expensive in terms of resources and budget. The organisation culture usually places equal
importance on all systems whereas a risk management approach would identify systems that are
more critical thus, creating a list of systems/projects in order of importance to the government
agency. In addition, the culture within the large organisation dictated that the IS staff should be
responsible for and manage the issues of achieving accreditation to the standard by themselves.
This compounded the problem because newer systems are generally more complex (including
security settings), thus requiring greater effort from IS staff to commission and maintain them.
In small agencies, the organisational culture had a greater influence on the lack of progress with
achieving compliance. Small agencies generally have limited resources available in the IS/IT
branch and additional projects, such as security compliance, must compete for limited resources.
Mandating improved security across agencies placed an increased workload on the staff. Small
agencies were already coping with other IS/IT issues of more complex systems, updates, software
patches, equipment replacement etc, and had limited access to training courses and forums.
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Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research
Based on the discussion above, practitioners should conduct a risk analysis of their agency systems
and determine the agency’s most critical system and thus complete certification firstly for this
system. Also, a comprehensive business impact analysis would allow senior management to assign
resources to the certification of the most critical agency systems.
A strategy for large agencies trying to achieve certification to the security standard and full risk
analysis of all business systems, must be undertaken to identify an agency’s most vital business
system. Certification of less critical systems should then be subsequently undertaken. Where large
agencies have multiple critical systems a business impact analysis would allow management to
determine the effect each system would have on an agency if it failed. For small agencies that
usually only have one or two critical systems (one being the finance or human resource system),
usually these systems are outsourced to security compliant central agencies or processing bureaux
thus, allowing the larger central agency (or organisation) to incorporate the smaller systems into
their security certification strategy an this improves IS security for both the central and small
agencies.
This study has recognised the differences across agencies rather than assuming that security
compliance within e-government would be the same for small, medium and large agencies. This
study highlights the deficiency of having a single viewpoint for an e-government study of this type.
Further analysis might compare data such as this, across various government portfolios as well as
across and between different organisation sectors. This study may also be highly relevant to other
national governments or multi-organisational corporations.
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